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A LOOK INTO GLASNOST'S IMPACT ON
THE SOVIET ART WORLD
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 28, 1990, Soviet artists engaged in an unprecedented pro-
test against the history of cultural repression in their country.' Artists
throughout the country staged a general strike of silence which was held
to protest the repressed state of their country's culture.2 Protests re-
curred throughout the day in the creative unions, as journalists halted
their work and as employees stopped their work at publishing houses.3
At 7:30 p.m., plays, concerts, cinemas, clubs, as well as the Bolshoi ballet
and other cultural and artistic institutions halted performances.4 Com-
mon grievances permeate all areas of Soviet culture, but this Comment
focuses on the areas of film, music, theater and painting in particular.
The common denominator of these mediums in the post-glasnost era is
the ubiquitous role of art in the Soviet Union.
Prior to glasnost,5 discussion on the role of art or artists was not
valued. The Soviet Union's government would only tolerate art which
propagated socialist opinions. According to Soviet Constitutional the-
ory, there are two kinds of opinions:
a correct opinion, which is a product of socialist consciousness
and encourages the development of a socialist or communist
society, and an incorrect opinion, which is of a reactionary na-
ture and hampers social progress. Freedom of speech concerns
only the former. The latter is contrary to socialist order and
must not be protected.6
Under these limitations, artists were divided into two groups: official and
unofficial.7 If an artist followed the Soviet State's requirements and
1. Culture in Distress, Pravda, June 29, 1990, at 1, reprinted in CURRENT DIGEST OF
SOVIET PRESS, Aug. 1, 1990, at 23.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Glasnost is a political term coined by Soviet President Gorbachev and his party, denot-
ing a new "openness" in the Soviet Union. See Sharlet, Party and Public Ideals in Conflict:
Constitutionalism and Civil Rights in the USSR, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 341, 345-47 (Symp.
1990).
6. Brunner, Freedom of Speech, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW, 343 (2d rev. ed.
1985).
7. Meisler, Casting a 'Glasnost' Glow on Once-Obscured Artist, SMITHSONIAN, Dec. 1989,
at 130, 134-35.
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channeled his or her creative energy into an acceptable format, the artist
could be classified as an official artist.' Official artists belonged to a state-
run organization which would facilitate each artist's career.9 These art-
ists were educated, housed, supplied and paid by the state.10 Unofficial
artists were those who did not follow the state's requirements. 1 Not
only did the state not help advance the unofficial artist's career, but the
state also would attempt to destroy any non-official artistic endeavor
through sanctions, discrimination, psychiatric internment or outright
force. 12
Artistic segregation began to crumble when glasnost arrived in
1986. Mikhail Gorbachev 3 promised new freedoms and less state con-
trol. 4 The distinction between official and unofficial state-approved ac-
tivity became blurred. 5 Likewise, preexisting censorship in the Soviet
Union decreased as the glasnost changes in policy emphasized a need for
unbridled exchanges of ideas throughout all areas of life.1 6 The transfor-
mation of ideals was to be cemented through codification.17 Of course,
this restructuring of the Soviet government's foundation philosophy
would take time, but the party program was to be hierarchically superior
to the state constitution until a new constitution could be written. 8
Changes in practice could happen immediately, but no one knew what
this unfamiliar freedom meant.' 9 Diverse activists within different cul-
tural meccas began to translate glasnost and democratization into actual
practice without awaiting legal institutionalization.2 ° Consequently, the
country's intellectual and cultural life began to lean toward the commer-
cialization of culture.2' With Soviet society experiencing freedom to cre-
ate art in the realms of film, music, theater and fine art, a market was
developing for these liberated modes of expression. Negative effects
8. See id. at 135.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Meisler, supra note 7, at 134-35.
12. See Sharlet, supra note 5, at 345-47.
13. Mr. Gorbachev has been the president of the Soviet Union since 1986 and he is the
moving force behind glasnost.
14. Meisler, supra note 7, at 133.
15. Id.
16. See Sharlet, supra note 5, at 341.
17. Id.
18. Osakwe, Equal Protection of Law in Soviet Constitutional Law and Theory - A Com-
parative Analysis, 59 TUL. L. REV. 974, 979 (Mar. 1985).
19. See generally Sharlet, supra note 5, at 341.
20. Id.
21. In the CPSU Central Committee, Pravda, Sept. 20, 1990, at 1-2, reprinted in CURRENT
DIGEST OF SOVIET PRESS, Oct. 31, 1990, at 26 [hereinafter CPSU].
[Vol. I11
SOVIET ARTISTS
flowed from this unchartered change because the absence of written and
legal structure for cultural reforms left no guidance. 2
As of March 1991, the Soviet Union has not codified laws ensuring
artists their rights as expressed in the promises of glasnost. The arts re-
main in trouble without a firm legal foundation, but ironically artistic
expression never has been stronger. Now, at least, the artists have a
voice with which to protest their conditions as well as contribute ideas in
creating their future. Yet this voice is unprotected in the absence of a
constitution ensuring the people's right to express ideas and a govern-
ment which enforces that right.
II. CREATIVE AND BUSINESS STRUCTURE ALTERATIONS IN SOVIET
CINEMA SINCE GLASNOST
A. Ideological Changes in Film
Before glasnost, the Soviet government ensured that the films pro-
duced within the country contained a certain didactic or ideological
value.23 Soviet movies were not created primarily for entertainment but
rather for professing the political line.24 This genre gave way to artistic
expression post-glasnost.25 Now movies will only be censored if a film is
found to be racist, pornographic or overly violent. 26 Virtually no ideo-
logical mandate is required,27 and consequently, filmmakers have been
able to dramatically expand upon their subject matter. One Soviet com-
mentator explains:
Today documentary filmmakers are again on the cutting edge
of many painful topics; they try to make us think about
whether society and the country, which is so important in
terms of its history, culture and intellectual resources, though it
has been warped and contaminated by Stalinism, are continu-
ing, through inertia, to live in a world of lies.2"
Indeed, little to no censorship exists when sex is depicted on the
screen.29 Glasnost has relieved screen heros from the duty of pretending
22. Id.
23. Taska, Film and Television Co-Productions with the USSR, 11 WHIFIER L. REV. 401
(Summer 1989).
24. See id.
25. Id. at 404.
26. Quinn-Judge, At Moscow Filmfest, A Smaller Role For Politics, Christian Science Mon-
itor, July 10, 1987, (Arts and Leisure), at 23.
27. See Taska, supra note 23, at 404.
28. Pashkov, Not to Lie to Ourselves; Izvestia, June 3, 1990, at 4, reprinted in CURRENT
DIGEST OF SOVIET PRESS, July 4, 1990, at 27.
29. See Kuchin, Filming the Abyss, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, Feb. 1990, at 42.
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to be asexual.3" However, the filmmaking associations have been criti-
cized for producing films which "appeal to unhealthy feelings and en-
courage cruelty and sensuality."'" Criticism is a component of a healthy
democratic society, yet creative liberation and discussion in one area
must not entirely captivate the Soviet public's attention. The danger ex-
ists when one liberalized area of filmmaking mutes previously censored
political problems which exist in a changing government.32 For example,
critics complain that censorship still exists and that filmmakers are still
unable to speak of sensitive political issues such as the Pamyat.
33
Whether or not filmmakers are free from censorship, inroads have been
made. The 1967 production of Commissar, directed by Alexander As-
koldov, was released in 1988.34 Set in the Ukraine in 1922, the film looks
at Jewish issues and Soviet history. 35 Likewise, the current production of
Taxi Blues, directed by Pavel Lungin, raises issues of anti-semitism and
class conflict which had been avoided pre-glasnost. 36 The Soviet Union's
history and culture are being accurately discussed for the first time since
Stalinism sealed up truths and distorted reality.37
B. Business Changes in Film
The business structure for Soviet filmmakers has gone through
many changes in the past five years.3' Glasnost paved the road for the
takeover of the official filmmakers union in May of 1986.3' Two-thirds of
the union's leadership was voted out and Elem Klimov was elected to
head the new Soviet Filmmakers Union.' One of the first tasks under-
taken was to form a conflict commission to look into movies which were
not allowed to be released from 1966 to 1986.41 Of these films, thirty
30. Id.
31. CPSU, supra note 21.
32. Kuchin, supra note 29, at 42.
33. The Pamyat, which means memory, is an unofficial extremist group known for its anti-
semitic views.
34. Sterritt, Soviet "Commissar" in US, Christian Science Monitor, July 1, 1988, (Arts and
Leisure, Film), at 19.
35. Id.
36. Sterritt, Films Around the World, Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 13, 1990, (The
Arts), at 14.
37. Pashkov, supra note 28, at 27.
38. Dunlop, Soviet Cultural Politics, PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, Nov./Dec. 1987, at 34,
36.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 38.
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were cleared for release.42 Klimov had progressive ideas of where the
union was headed and declared the union's new model for the film indus-
try would include "democratization and decentralization." 43
In an effort to expose the West" to Soviet film, members of the
Klimov team travelled to the West.45 This venture has been successful.
At the Cannes film festival in May 1987, for instance, Tenzig Abriladze's
anti-Stalinist film, Repentance, won the runner-up prize." Repentance
was one of the Soviet films shelved for two years prior to glasnost's ac-
ceptance of previously untolerated films. 47 To aid in the endeavor for
international exposure, a new rule was adopted on April 1, 1990, which
allows many Soviet film studios the right to do business with foreign
countries.4" Soviet film studios finally have the chance to break with the
pre-glasnost tradition of reliance on state funding.49 The studios hope to
become self-supported by the profits generated from their films.50 These
changes depended on worldwide commercialization of the Soviet film
product. 51
Although Soviet filmmakers produce quality films, America is hesi-
tant to accept foreign films which are dubbed or subtitled and, therefore,
the Soviet films are usually relegated to art venues in which they receive
limited exposure.52 Soviet movie producers allege that Columbia and
Twentieth Century-Fox executives do not believe that Soviet films can
have commercial success in the United States. 53 This attitude thwarts
the Soviet filmmakers from achieving their goal of widespread distribu-
tion of Soviet film. This American assessment of Soviet film desirability
may be a premature evaluation considering the success that other Soviet
mediums have had internationally. 4 Yet, American film studios are pri-
42. Id. Some of the movies cleared for release included Muratova's The Long Goodbye
(1971) and Abuladze's Repentance (1984).
43. Dunlop, supra note 38, at 38.
44. This comment will refer to the East and West. East signifies the Soviet Union and
West entails the United States and western Europe.
45. Dunlop, supra note 38, at 39.
46. Id.
47. Quinn-Judge, The Man Behind the USSR's Most Popular Film - A Parable About Tyr-
anny, Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 7, 1987, (Arts and Leisure, Film), at 19.
48. Taska, supra note 23, at 402.
49. Gritten, Mosfilm Goes Hollywood, L.A. Times, Nov. 4, 1990, (Calendar), at 5, col. 1.
50. Dunlop, Soviet Cultural Politics, PROBLEMS WrrH COMMUNISM, Nov./Dec. 1987, at
34, 38.
51. Gritten, supra note 49, at 5, col. 1.
52. Taska, supra note 23, at 403.
53. Quinn-Judge, At Moscow Filmfest, A Smaller Role For Politics, Christian Science Mon-
itor, July 10, 1987, (Arts and Leisure), at 23.
54. See infra, sections on music, theater and art.
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madly interested in making their money by selling American films to the
Soviet Union rather than by distributing Soviet films.55
Klimov is also interested in bringing western films into the Soviet
Union.56 At the Moscow Film Festival in 1987, Klimov promised an
increase of western films to be shown in the Soviet Union. 7 Since glas-
nost, the Soviet Union has been introduced to western films, such as Fel-
lini's 8 1/2, and Antonioni's Red Desert,5" as well as the American
classic, Gone With the Wind.59
Until glasnost, American films were sold to Soviet film studios for a
flat rate.' Now that Soviet studios are free to deal directly with different
production entities, the pricing of western films entering the Soviet
Union should become less uniform than it was before glasnost.6" In fact,
Soviet film studios have proposed that film distribution be done on a per-
centage basis.62 However, without codified rules, the government hap-
hazardly administers restrictions.63 For instance, the Soviet Union's
Ministry of Culture issued instructions on procedures for registering
videoteques which show films commercially."4 The profits from the
video clubs totaled six to ten billion rubles annually.65 These large profits
were realized because the clubs and small cooperatives had started releas-
ing bootlegged copies of American films such as Rambo.66 These boot-
legged releases infringed on the rights of American and Soviet
distributors.6 7 In addition, little of the money went to the Soviet state
budget while the majority of the money went to people whom the govern-
ment classified as "wheeler-dealers. '6  The government was unhappy
with this private profit making and attempted to alleviate the problem by
banning these small video clubs.69 Western films nevertheless continue
55. Quinn-Judge, supra note 53, at 23.
56. Glasnost Goes to the Movies, THE ECONOMIST, July 25, 1987, at 79.
57. Id
58. Medvedev, Cultural Revival in the Soviet Union, DISSENT, Winter 1988, at 15, 16.
59. Christie & Goldberg, "Gone With the Wind" Comes to Moscow Courtesy of Ted Tur-
ner, and Soviet Moviegoers Give a Damn, L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 1990.
60. Taska, supra note 23, at 403.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. CPSU supra note 21, at 26.
64. Id.
65. According to the exchange rate on 01/22/91, this would amount to approximately 4
million to 1.1 billion American dollars.
66. Taska, supra note 23, at 402.
67. Id.
68. CPSU supra note 21, at 26.
69. Taska, supra note 23, at 402.
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to reach the Soviet Union through regulated channels."° It is estimated
that of Moscow's one hundred twenty-five theaters, sixty percent are
showing American films.71
Soviets are also trying to entice westerners to film in the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Soviets have respectable film and tel-
evision studios, film facilities, locations for shooting and lower costs of
production.72 An episode of the New York based television show, Head
of the Class, was filmed in Moscow, indicating that the Soviets have had
some success in the endeavor.7 3 To prepare for future visitor produc-
tions, Mosfilm, the largest Soviet movie studio,74 negotiated with the
Hilton Hotel chain to build a luxury hotel near the film studio in Mos-
cow.75 The intermix between East and West is growing. It is very clear
that great opportunity exists for American and Soviet cultural exchange
through the exchange of fim products and collaboration on film creation.
III. ROCK MusIc IN THE SOVIET UNION
A. Rock Music Before Glasnost
Pre-glasnost, rock music in the Soviet Union existed as an under-
ground mode of creative expression which the establishment refused to
tolerate.76 Rock music as a form of musical expression was not only
looked down upon, but was unable to survive through any legitimate
structure.77 The Communist party banned rock groups from performing
on theater stages as well as from composing in recording studios.7 8 So-
viet musicians, even unofficial amateurs, may not consider their music
political 9 nor themselves dissidents.80 Yet, the act of performing was
70. Gritten, supra note 49, at 6.
71. Id
72. Taska, supra note 23, at 405.
73. Id.
74. Gritten, supra note 49, at 5, col. 1.
75. Id. at 6, col. 2.
76. Marcus, Let Freedom Rock UPDATE, May 18, 1990, at 14.
77. Id.
78. Id. See also Washburn, 0. C. Pop Beat: Success Spoiled Soviet Rock, Musician Says,
L.A. Times, Nov. 22, 1990, § F (Calendar), at 1, col. 3 (Orange County ed.). (When musical
groups, other than rock groups, were allowed to perform, they had to submit lyrics as well as
between-song comments for approval. In addition, the bands could only perform twenty per-
cent of their own material. The rest had to be official music created by members of the Union
of Soviet Composers.).
79. See Funky Glasnost, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1987, at 104.
80. See 20/20: Rock Around the Kremlin (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 21, 1985) (tran-
script available from ABC News, Box 2020, Ansonia Station, New York, N.Y. 10023) [herein-
after 20/20].
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deemed political in itself"1 While the lyrics were not anti-communist,
the Ministry of Culture did not like the music because the mode of ex-
pression was outside their control.8 2
Undeniably, the essence of rock music is its social content and thus
rock music starts out as an event of social life, not aesthetic life. 3 For
instance, Soviet bloc rock groups sing "songs about people exasperated
by shortages of food and household goods, people despairing of the no-
tion that hard work pays in the end." 4 Indeed, rock music fundamen-
tally carries with it many meanings.85
Of course, rock music was not completely crushed by the repressive
foot of the establishment, but rather kept itself alive through recordings
made on cassettes and distributed without charge.8 6 The musicians did
not profit monetarily from this distribution, but black marketeers prof-
ited by reselling the tapes to friends.8 7 Musicians gained knowledge of
other groups through the underground trading. 8 To a limited extent,
musicians also could learn about the western music scene by buying cas-
settes on the black market which were supplied by foreigners travelling in
the Soviet Union.89
B. Rock Music Pervades the Soviet Union After Glasnost
With the advent of glasnost in 1986, the harassment of rock musi-
cians stopped.9 Not everyone was happy with the music, but it was tol-
erated. 9 No longer is it a crime to walk in Moscow with a rock album
under your arm. 92 An influx of western groups made their way out of
the confines of the underground and into the general public arena and for
the first time, the public could hear foreign rock and alternative bands
perform in the Soviet Union.93 For instance, a Heavy Metal Fest oc-
curred at Moscow's Lenin Stadium on August 12 and 13, 1989. 9' This
81. See Marcus, supra note 76, at 14.
82. Washburn, supra note 78, at 1, col. 3.
83. Issledovaniya, Rock Music? Subculture? Life-Style?, GORBACHEV AND GLASNOST:
VIEWPOINTS FROM THE SOVIET PRESS 154, 157-59 (I. Tarasulo ed. June 1989).
84. Echikson, Soviet-Bloc Rock, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 18, 1990, (Ideas), at 13.
85. Id
86. Marcus, supra note 76, at 14.
87. Id. See also 20/20, supra note 80.
88. 20/20, supra note 80.
89. See Marcus, supra note 76, at 14.
90. Id.
91. Pintos, Rocking the Musical Boat, WORLD PRESS REV., Feb. 1990, at 40.
92. Id.
93. See Glasnost Rock, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 14-28, 1989, at 58.
94. Id.
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event was allowed and was legitimized by being dubbed an anti-drug cru-
sade by the government. 95 The government even showed enthusiasm for
some of the rock events.96 For example, Vladimir Anosov, an official in
the tour organization department of the USSR State Concert Committee
said in January 1990, "[t]he main event of the year, perhaps, will be two
concerts in Moscow by the legendary Rolling Stones." 97
The means for furthering a Soviet musician's career also developed
as a result of glasnost. Rock musicians could now join the established
musicians union, Philharmonia.9a This membership would give them ac-
cess to the best equipment and professional status as musicians. 99 While
the privilege of having a legitimate agency advance the musician's career
is tempting, the drawbacks are indicative of communist control.' ° For
example, Philharmonia provides: (a) supervision and therefore political
control; (b) a high volume of performances; and (c) little money.
10 1
Also, in the official union, profits do not coincide with popularity.
1 2
Artists who belong to Philharmonia receive a set fee for their album or
concert regardless of how many people buy their albums or attend their
shows. '
0 3
The musicians' other option is to reject union membership and try
to gain access to the public without Philharmonia's help."° This ap-
proach allows a group to receive money according to how many people
buy their albums and attend their shows. '0 5 Another alternative to mem-
bership in Philharmonia is for musicians to join another official organiza-
tion, the Moscow Rock Lab. "o6
The Moscow Rock Lab acts as a liaison between independent Soviet
musicians and the foreign market.' 07 The first Soviet rock group to gain
exposure in the foreign market was the group Autograph, who played in
the Live Aid concert in 1986.108 This performance was the first chance
95. Id.
96. Charodeyev, Tours: Rolling Stones to Perform in Moscow, Izvestia, Jan. 21, 1990, at 4,
reprinted in CURRENT DIGEST OF SOVIET PRESS, Feb. 21, 1990, at 26.
97. Id.
98. See generally Funky Glasnost, supra note 79, at 104.
99. 20/20, supra note 80.
100. See Funky Glasnost, supra note 79, at 104.
101. Funky Glasnost, supra note 79, at 104.
102. 20/20, supra note 80.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Pintos, supra note 91, at 40.
107. Id.
108. Pintos, supra note 91, at 40. Live Aid was an international collaboration of musicians
to help raise money to alleviate world hunger.
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for the western public to see that rock existed behind the iron curtain.
The Moscow Rock Lab encourages musical exchange with the West and
helps Soviet artists get their work released by foreign record
companies.'°9
Despite all of the western influences, the Moscow Rock Lab's musi-
cians all sing in Russian.l° The language barrier between the East and
West lessens Soviet desirability by the West unless the Soviet product
communicates in English.1" Yet, musicians who sing in english are con-
sidered by most other Soviet musicians to have sold out to the West com-
pletely." 2 The commercial success to be gained by singing in english
allows monetary profits propel the music rather than the creative pro-
cess. Some musicians view singing in english as allowing the West to
strip away the Soviet's identity as a Soviet musician. This conflict be-
tween commercialization and artistic integrity is tearing bands apart.
For example, Aquarium's lead singer, Boris Grebenshchikov, opted for
western success when a major western record company was interested." 3
His band remained in Leningrad while Grebenshchikov left for Manhat-
tan." '4 The philosophical differences regarding singing in english will
continue to divide bands as long as the West does not change its aversion
to appreciating music in different languages.
Musical groups also exist outside any organization. Many of these
groups are in direct opposition to the rock labs and this radical wing of
musicians has counter-culture qualities.'15 Whatever route the artists
choose, Soviet musicians are trying to share their Soviet rock with the
West without becoming mimics of the West or being exploited by the
Soviet Union through underpayment of a desired commodity.' 6
109. Id. See also Issledovaniya, supra note 83, at 156. The Moscow Rock Lab also recog-
nizes that there are diverse styles within rock music and has allowed for different musical
trends to be played out. For instance, within the Lab there is Heavy Metal, Mainstream,
Avant-Garde, and Electronic Romanticism music.
110. Pintos, supra note 91, at 40.
111. The same language barrier presented a problem with American film companies' aver-
sion towards Soviet films made in Russian. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
112. Pintos, supra note 91, at 40. For instance, the rock group Gorky Park sings in english
and is ridiculed by their own country's musicians. Id.
113. Ryback, A Somber Refrain For East Bloc Rock, Christian Science Monitor, May 31,
1990, at 10 (The Arts).
114. Id.
115. Issledovaniya, supra note 83, at 156.
116. See generally Pintos, supra note 91, at 40.
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poration, created a consortium for the international protection and active
commercial use of the intellectual property, name, and trademark of the
Bolshoi Theater.' Entertainment Corporation has no control over the
theater's creative work but does get forty percent of the profits generated
from this deal. I32 The Bolshoi is free to create while receiving an income
for the use of its name.
13 3
The smaller theaters do not have a name to sell and are the hardest
hit because they are not subsidized by the government.'3 4 Yet, despite
problems with the lack of backing, a small theater can make a more radi-
cal break from traditional expectations of the theater and grow along
with the other newly freed creative modes of expression. 135 The theater
does not remain an island because the actual notion of theater includes
writers, musicians, actors and artists. The arts are brought from the
stage and into the actors' studios. Small theatrical studios are often dec-
orated with the latest avant-garde art and filled with modern music. 36
This ensemble of different creative fields merging with newly acquired
liberties sets the stage for an interesting future for both the theater and its
audience.
V. SOVIET ARTISTS
A. Pre-Glasnost Categorization of Official Artists
In 1934, Joseph Stalin 37 decreed that the only acceptable art was
figurative art: so-called socialist realism.'33 To maintain this standard,
in the early 1930s the Stalinist regime disbanded many artist organiza-
tions.139 A brief thaw of the existing intolerance for rebellious art took
place in the late 1950s and early 1960s under Nikita Khrushchev. 14
This abruptly ended in 1962 with the Moscow exhibit "30 Years of Mos-
cow Art."'' At the Moscow exhibit, Khrushchev spotted examples of
abstract art of which he did not approve and believed the Soviet Union
131. Id.
132. Id. at 30.
133. Id
134. See generally Smelyansky, supra note 118, at 33.
135. Smelyansky, supra note 118, at 33.
136. Id.
137. Stalin was Secretary General of the Communist party from 1922 to 1953 and was
Premiere of the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1953. 11 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITAN-
NICA 205 (1988).
138. Young with Rinehart, Culture and Glasnost, MACLEAN'S, July 31, 1989, 42, at 43.
139. Meisler, supra note 7, at 142.
140. Young with Rinehart, supra note 138, at 43. Khrushchev was Premiere of the USSR
from 1958 to 1964. 6 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 843 (1988).
141. Meisler, supra note 7, at 142.
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IV. THEATER IN THE SOVIET UNION
Prior to glasnost, the theater 1 7 provided the creative outlet to the
ideological campaigns of the Soviet Union.' l The government con-
trolled the theaters which benefitted the actors since this control pro-
vided them with a theatrical school formed on solid traditions and
styles." 9 Yet, the theater's creative liberty was stifled by the govern-
ment's stronghold and the theater was anxious for an alternate
structure. 1
20
In 1986, at a time ripe for change, the All-Russian Congress of The-
ater Workers set up a new Soviet Theater Workers Union. 2 ' The elec-
tions produced a ten percent turnover in the theater's leadership. 22 The
policy changes included: (a) theater collectives having full independence
in the selection of plays; (b) wages of theater personnel depending to
some extent on profitability of their productions; (c) theaters setting their
own admission prices; and (d) new theaters opening to promote Soviet
youth participation. 123 This grassroots union successfully achieved free-
dom from governmental control. 124 From 1988 to the present day, thea-
ters have been selecting and staging plays of their own.' 25 The classics
may still be performed, but from a new angle.
2 6
Yet, theater groups paid a price for leaving their contributors who
imposed creative control. 127 The structure disappeared and left creative
freedom without monetary backing. 28 The absence of funding affected
the talent generated in the theater, which in turn diffused the theaters'
audience. 29 A theater needs an audience, because without one a theater
ceases to exist.
The lack of sufficient financial backing even affected the prestigious
Bolshoi Theater. 30 In April 1989, the British firm, Entertainment Cor-
117. Theater represents actors, stage crew, etc. and not the building.
118. Smelyansky, 'Glasnost' Produces A Cultural Revolution, 'Our Country and Theater Live
in Anticipation, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, Feb. 1990, at 32.
119. Medvedev, Bits of Light in a Gray World - Cultural Life in the Soviet Union, DISSENT,
Winter 1987, at 46.
120. See generally Smelyansky, supra note 118, at 32.
121. Id.
122. Dunlop. supra note 38, at 39.
123. Id. at 39-40.
124. See Smelyansky, supra note 118, at 32.
125. Smelyansky, supra note 118, at 32.
126. Id. at 33.
127. See generally Smelyansky, supra note 118, at 32.
128. Smelyansky, supra note 118, at 33.
129. Id.
130. Belyavsky, Penniless Palace, Pravda, July 17, 1990, at 3, reprinted in CURRENT DI-
GEST OF SOVIET PRESS, Aug. 22, 1990, at 29.
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should not allow.142 Thereafter began renewed intolerance for anything
other than social realism. 43 Alternative art was kept alive, albeit hidden,
through underground artist communities.'"
Meanwhile, the state-sanctioned artists received the benefits of being
categorized as official artists. 145 To advance an official writer or painter's
career, the Soviet government provided the artist with adequate supplies,
work space, living quarters, recognition, salary and sales.'" A young
Soviet received professional training and then graduated to membership
in an official union. 14  These unions allowed the artist to create only
state-approved art as their occupation. 14  Only state-sanctioned official
artists were allowed to sell their works to the government. 149 Yet, some
artists refused to obey the government restrictions and considered those
who joined the union as betraying truth in art in favor of the official
propaganda and distortion of reality."'5 Such compromise of conscience
allowed some artists to assume high positions in the cultural hierarchy,
but restricted the possibility of creating works of artistic value commonly
associated with freedom to create.' 5 ' Although the official artists ruled
the Soviet art world, they received little, if any, interest from the pub-
lic. "'52 In 1985, numerous official art exhibitions were organized for the
fortieth anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany. 15' The museums
were unable to recoup their expenses.' 54 Likewise, none of the world's
museums had been buying paintings of the Soviet Academy of Art mem-
bers. "I Social realism could not stand as the only acceptable method of
art. 56 The Soviet government needed to address other types of art which
did not conform to a strict socialist message.
B. Pre-Glasnost Categorization of Unofficial Artists
In contrast to the official artists, unofficial artists had to obtain day
142. Id. (Khrushchev shouted, "Jackasses! ... We are declaring war on you.") Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Meisler, supra note 7, at 135.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Young with Rinehart, supra note 138, at 42.
150. Medvedev, supra note 119, at 46.
151. Id.
152. Medvedev, Cultural Revival in the Soviet Union, DISSENT, winter 1988, at 15, 16.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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jobs to avoid becoming classified as parasites on society, a violation of
communist law.15 7 Not only were these artists not recognized by their
government, but also they were not allowed to generate avant-garde
art. l58 However, this precarious position allowed these creators to pro-
duce avant-garde art in the underground art world.5 9 However, their
art could not reach a marketplace which would generate great monetary
rewards.' 6" The sole purpose of producing underground artwork was to
further artistic goals because underground artists only needed to appeal
to themselves.
The unofficial artists were often mistakenly categorized by journal-
ists as political dissidents, even when their concerns were primarily aes-
thetic, not political. 6 ' Ernst Neizvestney, a sculptor, stated "American
journalists know me only as a dissident or like a military hero, fighting
Khrushchev, they know the story but there is no analysis of the art."''
62
This stigmatism is similar to that found with rock musicians, where the
mere act of singing was regarded as political, although the lyrics of the
songs often did not contain political messages.
1 63
Unofficial artists had the added frustration of not being able to freely
exhibit their works. In 1974, unofficial artists held an outdoor show in
an open field on the outskirts of Moscow. 64 This exhibit lasted only
minutes before Leonid Brezhnev's 165 government had bulldozers destroy
this Sokolniki exhibition. 166 Thugs (non-official government employees)
and water trucks were sent in to beat away the crowds and bulldozers
buried what the state considered decadent art. 16 7 These government
hooligans retaliated against people whose behavior did not conform to
state policy even after bureaucratic sanctions had been applied. ' 68 In ad-
dition, the victims were denied recourse of a criminal complaint because
official personnel did not carry out the actions. 169 However, unofficial
artists continued creating art within their own private enclaves of artists
157. Meisler, supra note 7, at 135. Parasitism refers to a citizen who lives off of society
without performing his or her share of society's work. IM.
158. Id.
159. Id. Avant-garde art is an experimental treatment of art.
160. Id. at 132-33.
161. Wallach, Marketing Perestroika, ART IN AMERICA, Apr. 1989, at 53, 54.
162. Id. at 56.
163. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
164. Young with Rinehart, supra note 138, at 43.
165. Brezhnev was the leader of the Soviet Union from 1964 until 1982. 2 THE NEW EN-
CYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 507 (1988).
166. Young with Rinehart, supra note 138, at 43.
167. Meisler, supra-note 7, at 131.
168. Id.
169. Sharlet, supra note 12, at 346.
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and the underground art scene burgeoned throughout the period of intol-
erance. 170 In time, some artists were able to display their work in the
Soviet Union although these exhibitions were sporadic, incomplete and
generally held outside established mainstream art world venues.' 17 So-
viet avant-garde art was also seen limitedly in America through New
York exhibitions in non-profit spaces. 72
C. Glasnost Redefines the Official and Unofficial
Artist's Role in Society
Ironically, unofficial art was not only tolerated after 1986, but it also
became the pride of MOSCOW. 173 This ability to accept the art is partly
due to glasnost's eradication of artistic censorship.'74 The unofficial art-
ists would not have to tailor their art to fit acceptable norms because
most art, aside from blatant pornography and direct attacks on living
political figures, could be publicly exhibited. 17  In addition, exhibits are
allowed to be held uninterrupted in public forums176 and official Soviet
magazines have also started to cover what was once unofficial art.
177
This new competition entering the art market was an affront to official
artists who had obeyed the rules. 178 For example, official union artists
were threatened when unofficial street artists began selling artwork in
parks. 179 The official artists had no recourse because the government
would no longer support a stagnant art world. The official artists soon
realized that their reign over the Soviet art world would have to be
shared with unofficial artists.'80
This thrust of unofficial artists into the public's view changed gov-
ernmental perspectives of the unofficial artists. Glasnost legitimized the
Gorbachev bureaucrats' blurring of the distinction between official and
unofficial art. 8 1 Indeed, the official views on art radically changed. On
170. Meisler, supra note 7, at 142.
171. Wallach, supra note 161, at 53.
172. For instance, there was the 1982 show, "Transplantation of the Russian Spirit: Rus-
sian Samizdat Art" and a larger exhibit in 1986 entitled "Sots Art." Id. at 59.
173. Meisler, supra note 7, at 131.
174. Gambrell, The Perils of Perestroika, ART IN AMERICA, Mar. 1990, at 46, 48 [hereinaf-
ter The Perils of Perestroika].
175. Id.
176. Meisler, supra note 7, at 133.
177. The Perils of Perestroika, supra note 174, at 49.
178. Gambrell, Perestroika Shock ART IN AMERICA, Feb. 1989, at 123, 132 [hereinafter
Perestroika Shock].
179. Id.
180. Id. at 124.
181. Meisler, supra note 7, at 133.
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November 21, 1989, the Soviet Minister of Culture, Nikolai Gubenko
was asked his views on the official style of social realist art. ' 2 Gubenko
stated, "I don't know what this means ... [E]ach of us artists has his
own [concept of] realism . . . [I]t is the task of the new generation to
exclude this kind of formula."' 83
The Gorbachev regime's promotion of unofficial art resulted in art-
ists once considered outcasts being asked to exhibit in official capaci-
ties. 84 In July, 1988, the Union of Artists of the USSR invited ten
unofficial artists to exhibit alongside its own members in a massive show
in Moscow.' The exhibit also reached the West.' 6 The glasnost policy
was being tested within its own borders as well as from the Western
world.
D. The Western World's First Glance at Soviet Avant-Garde Artists
In 1986, glasnost opened the doors for the world to seek the unoffi-
cial art being created within the Soviet Union." 7 While the official art
had not received widespread acclaim, unofficial art was a fresh, marketa-
ble commodity which affected the international art world.' The West
obtained a taste of the Soviet avant-garde through the help of Anne
Livet, Steven Reichard and Volkert Klaucke who started the company,
Sovart, which was designed to place Soviet artists with responsible
American galleries.' 8 9 These three people travelled to the Soviet Union
at the inception of glasnost and saw official artists by day and unofficial
artists by night."9 By February 1988, part-time, unofficial artists were
exhibiting to each other, to a few patrons and to foreign visitors and
diplomats in their studio apartments or in clandestine group shows. 1 9'
Some shows featured enough theatre, poetry and bizarre dress to make
them more like happenings than art exhibitions. 92 Klaucke had a large
role in convincing the Soviets to sell the work of unofficial artists and in
opening up the American market. 193 At first, the Soviet government was
182. Levitsky, The Restructuring of Perestroika: Pragmatism and Ideology (The Preamble
to the Soviet Constitution of 1987 Revisited), 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 235, 242.
183. Id.
184. See Meisler, supra note 7, at 133.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 134.
187. See generally Wallach, supra note 161, at 59.
188. Id.
189. Wallach, supra note 161, at 59.
190. Id.
191. Meisler, supra note 7, at 135.
192. Id.
193. Wallach, supra note 161, at 63.
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hesitant and indeed confused by the enthusiasm for work it had disre-
garded or despised.' 94 The total lack of interest in the artists they
honored also was baffling to them.'95 The great foreign interest and hard
currency to be gained, however, persuaded the government to implement
glasnost by dialogue and exchange of art.'96 The western idea of the
work of art as precious object and marketable commodity had invaded
the Soviet Union.' 97 As a result of this invasion, art by the Soviets is now
a form of communication beyond the art community circle.' 98
The infamous 1988 Sotheby's international auction in Moscow of
contemporary and early twentieth century Soviet art forever changed the
Soviet art world's impression of Soviet art.'99 The capitalist art market
blatantly endorsed Soviet art.2" One hundred twenty paintings sold for
about 3.5 million dollars.20 Yet, the Sotheby's auction took place in
pounds sterling, making it impossible for Soviet citizens to participate.
20 2
Art sold for astronomical amounts, but the artists were taxed as much as
seventy per cent of their earnings from the auction.20 3 After the
Sotheby's auction, the artists set their prices with high hopes and in total
ignorance of the American market.' 4 Soviet artists themselves were
now overvaluing the art. 205
Following the Sotheby's auction, an unprecedented Soviet avant-
garde artist exhibition occurred in the West.2 ° s In New York, on May
30, 1989, "10 + 10: Contemporary Soviet and American Painters"
opened.20 7 This unprecedented exhibition of ten young Soviet and ten
young American artists toured five American museums over a one year
period.20 8 The 10 + 10 exhibit was conceived when Gordon Dee Smith,
an American organizer of cultural exchange museum exhibitions, met
with Genrikh Popov, the chief of the Soviet Ministry of Culture's Fine
194. Id at 59.
195. Id
196. Hard currency is currency which is traded frequently.
197. Hochfield, Up From the Underground, ART NEWS, May 1990, at 152, 156 [hereinafter
Up From the Underground].
198. See generally Hochfield, In a Neutral Zone, ART NEWS, Dec. 1989, at 47, 48 [hereinaf-
ter In a Neutral Zone].
199. See generally Meisler, supra note 7, at 133.
200. Id
201. Id.
202. Perestroika Shock, supra note 178, at 128.
203. Young with Rinehart, supra note 138, at 43.
204. Wallach, supra note 161, at 63.
205. Up From the Underground, supra note 197, at 153.
206. Meisle-, supra note 7, at 134.
207. Id. See also Wallach, supra note 161, at 61.
208. Meisler, supra note 7, at 134.
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Arts department. 2" Surprisingly, Popov agreed to let American cura-
tors come to the Soviet Union to select the paintings.21° That event even-
tually led to a large six hundred piece collaboration by the United States,
West Germany and the Soviet Union entitled, "Russian and Soviet Art
of the Avant-Garde 1910-1930" which will open in New York in 1991.2'1
The addition of a new and previously hidden method of expression which
is uniquely Soviet can only serve to enrich the international art world.
E. The Soviet Government's Structure in Exporting Soviet Art
Prior to glasnost, the business of trading Soviet art was relatively
simple; only the Ministry of Foreign Trade administered Soviet foreign
trade.21 2 Yet, the inadequacies of the old regulations for exporting art
surfaced and new methods were developed.21 3 For instance, the Artists
Union and ministry salons were being granted autonomous financial sta-
tus to cut some of the red tape.214 As a result, foreigners could buy art
through either official salons or cooperatives.215 Pavel Khoroshilov
opened the Ministry of Culture's art export salon in 1986.216 His staff
was more open and aesthetically sophisticated than the staff at the Art-
ists Union.217 Also, this salon chose to disregard an artist's official sta-
tus. 211 The First Gallery, being the first gallery to exhibit avant-garde art
in Moscow, retained similar conditions in order to facilitate the purchase
of Soviet art by foreigners.219 Whatever route was chosen, art sales oc-
cuffed in hard currency and were regulated by both the Ministry of Fi-
nance and Ministry of Culture.220 Either way, artists receive ten percent
of sales price in hard currency. 221 Thus, the government encouraged
joint ventures to export the Soviet Union's competitively priced products
to the West in order to earn hard currency.222
On April 1, 1987, Soviet citizens obtained the right to organize co-
209. Id.
210. d
211. Young with Rinehart, supra note 138, at 43.
212. Levin, Soviet-American Trade From the Perspective of a Former Soviet Trade Official,
11 WHITTIER L. REV. 411 (Summer 1989).
213. Perestroika Shock supra note 178, at 128-31.
214. Id. at 130.
215. Id. at 131.
216. Id. at 126.
217. Id. at 127.
218. Perestroika Shock supra note 178, at 123, 127.
219. Id. at 131.
220. Up From the Underground, supra note 197, at 157.
221. Id.
222. Levin, supra note 212, at 412-13.
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operatives. 223 Cooperatives are essentially private businesses existing as
partnerships.224 Their aim is to provide goods and services which the
state run economy is unable to provide. 225 On April 1, 1989, the cooper-
atives, along with virtually any other governmental enterprise, were al-
lowed to trade directly with foreign individuals and entities, which
consequently enabled them to hold foreign currency.2 26 Thus, Soviet
businesspeople could deal directly with the end product user or seller.227
Despite hazy procedures, now close to 100,000 cooperatives flourish in
the Soviet Union.228 Cooperatives are more flexible than the larger and
more cumbersome operations of government sponsored enterprises.229
As a result, cooperatives remain more active in negotiations with western
firms.
2 30
This unchartered course presents problems because the Soviet busi-
nesspeople know what they want, but are inexperienced in foreign trade
operations. 231 For instance, dealing with world market prices, practices
and rules governing import and export operations, even inside the Soviet
Union, requires a business sense previously unneeded.232 This lack of
knowledge is due in large part to the fact that Soviet commercial law is
often unpublished, untested in courts of law, as well as unknown to the
people who execute it.
2 33
There is a growing imbalance in the sphere of culture between the
economic and financial activity of the state institutions and that of the
cooperatives. 234 The inequities in pay in the cultural sphere are causing
an exodus of personnel from state institutions and "engendering narrow-
minded pragmatism." 235 Yet, the Soviet government does not approve of
the guidance that the cultural process is receiving. With all the changes,
the Ministry of Culture and Artists Union continue to exercise de facto
control over the export of art.236
223. Bazyler, Making Profits From Perestroika: Soviet Economic Reform and New Trade
Opportunities in the Gorbachev Era, 11 WHITrIER L. REV. 323, 330 (Summer 1989).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Zimbler, Soviet Cooperatives and East-West Trade, 11 WHITTIER L. REV. 387, 391
(Summer 1989). See also Levin, supra note 212, at 413.
227. Levin, supra note 212, at 412.
228. Bazyler, supra note 223, at 330.
229. Levin, supra note 212, at 413-14.
230. Id. at 414.
231. Id. at 412.
232. Id.
233. Zimbler, supra note 226 at 391.
234. CPSU, supra note 21, at 26.
235. Id.
236. The Perils of Perestroika, supra note 174, at 48.
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The phenomena exhibited in the Sotheby's auction resulted in the
Soviet government officially treating art as an export barter commodity,
comparable with vodka and caviar on the limited list of desireable Soviet
products.237 For instance, there was a 1.5 million dollar rental fee for the
American bound Malevich retrospective. 238 Art exporting became a fo-
cal point for the government. Regulations on art exports had been
designed to keep foreign currency in the government by preventing for-
eigners from using cheap black market rubles to buy art.239 Yet these
regulations arguably backfired.
In 1988, the work of avant-garde artists was displayed internation-
ally and artists began to receive permission to travel with their work.2"
This change in policy gave Soviet artists an opportunity to see western
art firsthand. 24' Free now to travel and exhibit abroad, Soviet artists
cluster in Munich, Amsterdam, Brussels or New York.242 Indeed, so
many Soviet artists are abroad that some exaggeratingly claim an artistic
life no longer exists within the Soviet Union.243
The reasons for working abroad include a combination of seeking
what the West has to offer as well as escaping the existing limitations in
the Soviet Union.2" For instance, Soviet artists are only allowed to take
five paintings or ten graphic works duty free when they leave the coun-
try. Therefore, it is easier to work abroad and use the hard currency
generated duty-free to buy things unavailable in the Soviet Union.245
With the exporting of Soviet art and Soviet artists creating works
outside the Soviet Union, many people are concerned that the art of an
entire generation is leaving the country.21 Indeed, the Soviet govern-
ment is doing little to keep art in its country. Currently, only one con-
temporary art museum exists in the Soviet Union and it is in Erevan, the
capital of Armenia.247 Soviet artists would like a simple public art mar-
ket in Moscow. 248 Although artists can sell directly to the public, few
Soviets can afford to compete with the sums western collectors are will-
237. Id
238. Id.
239. Perestroika Shock, supra note 178, at 128.
240. Meisler, supra note 7, at 133.
241. Young with Rinehart, supra note 138, at 43. Foreign art started to appear in the
Soviet Union, although mainly in Moscow. The Perils of Perestroika supra note 174, at 48.
242. In A Neutral Zone, supra note 198, at 47.
243. Up From the Underground, supra note 197, at 155.
244. Id. at 157.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 158.
248. In A Neutral Zone, supra note 198, at 48.
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ing to pay.2 49 The Soviet public is not strong enough to compete with the
West and without a commitment by the Soviet government to buy Soviet
art, the Soviet artists may be selling the best works to the West and de-
pleting the Soviet art world in the Soviet Union.
F The Art World in the Soviet Union After Its Introduction to the
Western Concept of Commercialization of Art
The commercialization of contemporary art has drastically affected
the private art world within the Soviet Union. Artists who used to get
together regularly to discuss new work or just to gather and talk about
art, life, death and religion, now usually meet at art events, and the talk
usually turns to money.25° One artist comments, "[s]ometimes it occurs
to me when I am making a drawing or a painting that I am making
money, and that is very dangerous. ' '251 Rumblings that the underground
is dead are also being heard.25 2 Some believe, "[i]t died on the day of
Sotheby's auction."'253 To be an honest artist once meant being ready to
endure poverty and all manner of deprivation. 254 The common denomi-
nator uniting unofficial artists was the desire to be the antithesis to the
well-fed artistic functionaries, official artists, for whom art was merely a
convenient way of getting an easy meal.2 55 The commercialization of art
seems to shift the focus of the creation of art from vehicle for artistic
expression to a technical process which can make money. Then art be-
comes a job and not an expression of ideas.
Even if the underground is not dead, it is in serious jeopardy.
Vadim Zakhorov, a member of an unofficial club of avant-garde artists in
Moscow, wears an eye patch to symbolize the crippled artist in Soviet
society.25 6 Some unofficial artists try to preserve the marginal identity
they had prior to glasnost. 257 The avant-garde artists living and working
in the Soviet Union still have to deal with many hardships ranging from
the theoretical complexities on the changing role of the artist, to the real
problems of supporting oneself and obtaining supplies needed to create
249. Young with Rinehart, supra note 138, at 43. With the changes in the art world, Sovi-
ets cannot afford to buy avant-garde pieces. Up From the Underground, supra note 197, at
158.
250. Perestroika Shock supra note 178, at 179.
251. Up From the Underground, supra note 197, at 152.
252. Id. at 154.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Meisler, supra note 7, at 138.
257. The Perils of Perestroika, supra note 174, at 55.
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the art.258
The artists themselves have splintered off into different factions. For
instance, there are the Vanguard artists who are usually in their late
twenties to early thirties. 2 9 Even if they are successful in the West, these
artists cannot get livable homes or studios and they encounter difficulty
obtaining art supplies, studio space and other necessary items in the So-
viet Union.2 ' The Soviet artists are now obliged to take part in the
international art world, but their possibilities are restricted by a weak
support system of museums, art journals, and schools.26 1
There are also the artists who have sold out and figured out what the
West really wants.262 These artists create paintings of office and living
room size and in colors which coordinate with post modem interiors.263
In the Soviet Union, for example, a black canvas is typically used and
color needs to be drawn out of the foundation canvas whereas the Soviet
artist in the West usually works from a white canvas and brings color to
the work.264 The changes in color and size of painting are not the only
reasons why Soviet artists antagonize others who deal with the West.
The Moscow artists who have established western connections are re-
ferred to as the Moscow Mafia, being accused of hoarding their contacts
and not wanting to help others achieve success.265
The new network of young artists on the Moscow scene treat their
successful seniors as sellouts and prefer to live their life as art.2 66 For
example, there is an unofficial and out-of-the-way Museum of Contempo-
rary Art. 2 67 It is forty-five minutes outside of Moscow and admittance is
by invitation only.2 6' The marginal artist groups have lasted even
throughout glasnost. The Toadstools are an uninhibited group of young
artists who look on painting as no different than satirical theatrical re-
view.2 6  The history of the Toadstools began when approximately sixty
artists lived in Furmanny, just outside of MOSCOW. 27 0 One subgroup of
the Toadstools, the Champions of the World, staged a rowdy perform-
258. Solomon, Vanguard Artists, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, Feb. 1990, at 38.
259. Id.
260. Id. See also Young and Rinehart, supra note 138, at 43.
261. Up From the Underground, supra note 197, at 159.
262. Solomon, supra note 258, at 38.
263. Smelyansky, supra note 118, at 39.
264. Interview with Irving Simon, artist (Dec. 10, 1990).
265. Up From the Underground, supra note 197, at 155.
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ance parodying the Sotheby's auction in which they auctioned garbage,
unwritten novels, and the like.
27 1
Despite the differences between Soviet artists, there are common de-
nominators in Soviet art which link all Soviet artists. Soviets cannot es-
cape from their artistic foundation altogether.2 71 For instance, many
Soviet paintings have a frantic, hurried finish and most Soviet canvasses
have textual matter somewhere.273 Also, nonrepresentational styles per-
meate the Soviet avant-garde, in order to remain an antithesis to official
art.2
74
Limited resources do make it difficult for freedom of expression to
emerge although the museums have some outlets which are already in
existence. Museums are letting their patrons get to know their artistic
history. For instance, fifty-nine years ago a great Soviet painter, Pavel
Nikolaevich Filonov"' nearly had his first retrospective at the Russian
Museum. 6 Three hundred of his artworks hung for two years without
an audience. 7 Then experts pronounced that the museum could not
show something that is incomprehensible. Until June 1988, the work
was ignored.2 79 Then the Russian Museum in Moscow opened Filonov's
first comprehensive retrospective.280 The new retrospective is a true ex-
pression and test of glasnost.28'
Similarly, after glasnost, the art of Kazimir Severinovich Malevich,
(1878-1935), was shown at the Russian Museum in Leningrad.2s2 Before
glasnost, some of Malevich's works were exhibited abroad but rarely in
the Soviet Union. 8 3 In addition to this exhibit, Malevich had an exhibit
in Moscow and both these showings were the first Soviet exhibitions of
the once banned artist's work in more than fifty years.284 At the January
1989 exhibit in Moscow, the Malevich retrospective attracted huge
crowds, proving that the Soviet public is interested when quality is
271. Id.
272. See generally Meisler, supra note 7, at 136.
273. Meisler, supra note 7, at 136.
274. Id.
275. Filonov lived from 1882 to 1941.
276. Bowlt, Rehabilitating the Russian Avant-Garde, ART NEWS, Feb. 1989, at 116, 117.
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284. Young with Rinehart, supra note 138, at 43.
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shown.2" 5 Now Malevich's collection is whole because of the temporary
integration of Stedelijk286 and Russian Museum collections.2"7
Presently in the Soviet Union, artists must wrestle not only with the
question of what their art means in the wider world but also with the
problem of where they fit into the marketplace.28 8 The western art mar-
ket is a baffling phenomenon.28 9 The artists exposed to the West are
wary of ghettoization, and understand that their best interests will be
served by finding their place as individual artists within the international
scene, which a few of them have already managed to do. 29  Mistakes
will be made, but that is how an artist grows.291 However, Soviets can-
not afford to have their government regress to a state of censorship and
artistic segregation. The government must concretely lay a written legal
foundation from which glasnost can become a springboard for all artists
in the Soviet community.
VI. CONCLUSION
The positive changes which glasnost has produced regarding free-
dom of expression can only be permanent if written into the forthcoming
Soviet constitution. Film, theater, music and painting all rely on expres-
sing ideas and the world can only share in the art when artistic expres-
sion is not forced underground due to a repressive government. The
world has shown its desire for the Soviet's creative expression of ideas.
While film and music are somewhat limited by language barriers29 2 and
theater is limited by its own definition of needing actors in order to create
and sustain a production, Soviet fine art seems to have shattered any
barrier preventing sharing between East and West. Fine art speaks a
language the world can understand and the art object can exist apart
from its creator. Yet, even Soviet art is in jeopardy without a govern-
ment which will ensure the freedom to create and disseminate the end
product. Despite the Soviet Union's current economic crisis which may
impede further progress by non-government/non-party organizations, an
ideological liberation solidified in the Soviet constitution will be the basis
285. Id.
286. The Stedelijk Museum is in Amsterdam.
287. Bowlt, supra note 276, at 118.
288. Wallach, supra note 161, at 66.
289. Up From the Underground, supra note 197, at 153. The Soviet artists learn that some
galleries are better than others, but do not know which. Id.
290. Wallach, supra note 161, at 66.
291. Id.
292. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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for democratic changes in the future and ensure the continuation of free
thought and artistic expression.
Julie S. Berkowitz

